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1. Introduction 
As demonstrated in Mohaddes et al. (2018) – especially Chapters 2 to 7 – the special characteristics of 
natural resource-rich countries – such as the price volatility of their exports, the exhaustibility of these 
resources, uncertainty of their revenues, pro-cyclicality of their budgetary expenditures, and 
vulnerability to rent seeking (especially in the weak institutional environments in which many of  them 
operate) – all pose severe challenges for fiscal policy and institutions in Resource Rich Arab Economies 
(RRAEs) and beyond.   
This paper serves two primary functions: first, to identify challenges faced by RRAEs and 
variations in their severity among the different countries over time, and second to articulate specific 
policy reforms that could contribute in overcoming these challenges. In order to provide some 
background, we begin with a historical overview of the fiscal institutions of some individual countries. To 
this end, we cover periods before and after the discovery of oil, and for both the earlier oil producers 
and those becoming major oil producers after the 1950s. This historical background makes it clear that 
while oil revenues over the last half century have greatly lowered the incentive in RRAEs to develop the 
kinds of democratic and legal institutions that have emerged elsewhere, the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) countries seem not to have had the incentive to develop these institutions even before oil was 
discovered in the region. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the historical overview of Arab oil 
exporting countries of the region before oil, then in the early years of oil until the 1980s and of the 
several key international, institutional and political changes that took place over these periods. Section 3 
identifies each of the several challenges deemed to be most important and common across the RRAEs, 
but also variations in their severity across the RRAEs and over time. These sections provide the 
background information and motivation for Section 4 where we identify reforms that we feel could be of 
considerable help to the RRAEs (and potentially other oil exporters) in dealing with the various 
challenges they are facing. Finally, Section 5 offers some concluding remarks. 
  
2. Historical Background 
This section provides an account of the budgetary situations and institutions of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) countries: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates. More 
specifically, we investigate what the budgets of the GCC countries looked like before oil was discovered 
and the implications of significant oil revenues for budgets and fiscal institutions in the region.  
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2.1 Before Oil 
Before oil, the tribal and other societies of the current GCC region were largely merchant societies 
relatively open to international trade and therefore much of their revenues came from customs duties 
collected from the merchants (Herb, 2014). The importance of customs revenues of course varied with 
the quantities of imports and the number of ship arrivals at the ports. In this context, these societies did 
not benefit from well-defined budgetary institutions, and the distribution of revenues reflected the 
political economy dynamics between the merchants and the rulers. 
What is interesting, and as noted by Herb (2014) and Lorimer (1908a, 1908b), the 
openness/autocratic character of the budgets varied from one source to another, with Kuwait, at that 
time at least, being the one where the rulers had the greatest power relative to the merchants. The 
autocracy in Kuwait at that time had come only recently, when in 1896 Mubarak al-Sabah staged an 
intra-royal family coup and then built a custom’s house to collect the taxes himself. This was very 
different from what had been common earlier, wherein the merchants collected the revenues but then 
shared them with the ruling family.  
In Dubai, (before it became part of the United Arab Emirates), the ruling Al-Maktoum family had 
welcomed traders by offering lower taxation. The provision or sale of land to merchants also constituted 
an important source of income. 
During the Great Depression of the early 1930s, new sources of revenue started to appear in the 
form of fees paid by the international oil companies for exploration rights. These revenues were 
appropriated directly by the ruler. In Kuwait, merchants formed a coalition with the weaker members of 
the royal family who, too, had been squeezed by the declining trade revenues and their much lesser 
access to exploration revenues. They formed a National Council, backed also by the British (Herb, 2014) 
that called for elections to an assembly. By 1939, however, when the power of the merchants had been 
further weakened by the continuing depression, the ruler and other members of the ruling family came 
back together to share the new oil exploration fees more fully among each other, but at the expense of 
the merchants.  
A similar attempt to form an assembly arose in Bahrain but the British resident in Bahrain stood 
up against this and played a considerable role in Bahraini policy (Herb, 2014). In the other Gulf 
sheikhdoms where the merchant classes were smaller, reform movements to provide them with more 
representation, like those in Kuwait and Bahrain, did not arise.  
Not surprisingly, the corresponding data on the expenditures side of the budgets before oil are 
even less precise than that on the revenue side. Since some members of the royal families often 
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undertook certain official responsibilities, it was also not easy to determine how much, if any, of the 
allocations to royal family members were compensation for services rendered as opposed to simply 
returns accruing to their elite ownership status. In some cases also, members of the royal family were 
among the more prominent merchants of the private sector. Yet, in most cases, it was clear that 
allocations to the military, police and the royal families themselves were among the most important 
expenditure categories in the before-oil period. 
Saudi Arabia differed from the other GCC countries on both the revenue and expenditure sides 
of the budget. Because external trade was somewhat less important, fees obtained from visitors on the 
Hajj (the annual Islamic pilgrimage to Mecca) were the most important source of Saudi revenues. 
Because of their large role on the revenue side of the budget, religious authorities also came to play a 
more important role than merchants on the expenditures side of budgets. Prior to oil, there had thus 
been little need in these countries to develop the kinds of fiscal institutions capable of raising taxes from 
the local populations.   
 
2.2 The Coming of Oil 
The discovery of oil occurred in this poor institutional environment in which rulers did not face 
significant restraints on their power and enjoyed ample access to rents which they used primarily for 
private purposes (Galal and Selim, 2013). Oil was first discovered in the region in Iran in commercial 
quantities at Masjid-i-Suleiman on 26 May 1908 (Mohaddes and Pesaran, 2014), soon thereafter in Iraq, 
and then in 1929 also in Bahrain. Once oil was discovered in these locations, exploring for it and 
producing it throughout the region became a very attractive pursuit for international oil companies 
(mostly British, French and American) because unlike in much of the rest of the world, in the Middle East 
it was found in large pools, reasonably near the surface and usually not far from ports, which made it 
cheap to extract, to generate large value added per drilled oil well, and to export. Given that oil 
production is capital intensive, exploration followed by production and export could be accomplished by 
the oil companies in the Gulf quite rapidly, without having to recruit or train large numbers of workers 
(Issawi, 1982). While oil was discovered in many of the countries in the region by the beginning of World 
War II, it was not until 1950 that the oil sector became important in the economies in the region, and 
specifically in terms of government revenue (Mohaddes and Pesaran, 2014).  
By 1950, 12 years after significant amount of oil in commercial quantities had been found in 
Dhahran, Saudi Arabia had become a major oil producer and with King Abdulaziz Ibn Saud’s threat to 
nationalize the oil company, the King had managed to reach and an agreement with the Arabian 
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American Oil Company (Aramco) to reduce the foreign oil company’s share to 50 percent. This 
encouraged other countries in the region to renegotiate their contracts with the international oil 
companies (for instance Iraq in 1952), and as such secured much larger revenues to the host 
governments. Notably, as the oil revenues started to rise in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere, the royal 
families began to loosen their purse strings and accumulate large debt (AlShehabi 2017).  
The presence of colonial powers in several such countries gave them an opportunity to intervene 
in the budgetary process and they at least claimed to introduce more budgetary discipline. In most cases, 
such attempts were resisted by the ruling families. Although significant amount of oil had been found in 
Kuwait in 1937, its oil boom began only early in the 1950s, prompting the British to try to install advisors 
to control the budgetary process. Yet, Kuwait’s rulers refused to go along with this, instead appointing 
members of the royal family and other local elites to top (financial) positions in the government aimed at 
establishing an overall balance of power. The new team installed an Audit Bureau to protect against major 
inefficiencies in budgetary allocations, but, in this case at least, in a way that was independent of the 
British (AlShehabi 2017). Shortly after Kuwait’s independence, however, and in response to demands by 
Iraq for its annexation, a major institutional reform occurred (Herb, 2014). In particular, its Audit Bureau 
and budgetary procedures were set up under the jurisdiction of parliament and the audited accounts were 
made public, making Kuwait not only the most democratic country in the region but also the one with the 
most open, transparent and well-defined budgetary institutions, at least at that time. Notably also, in the 
early years of this transparent budgeting system, the amount of funds allocated to the Emir and his family 
was limited to a specific amount. Subsequently, as oil revenues increased, the absolute amounts allocated 
to the Emir increased, but in percentage terms they were reduced.1 Moreover, in 1953, Sheikh al Sabah 
established the Kuwait Investment Board as a vehicle to manage the assets of the country. That 
investment board later became known as the Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA), a fund for the future 
generations as well as to promote diversification of the economy, and more commonly known as the 
world’s first Sovereign Wealth Fund and primary holder of government assets (Bahgat, 2011).  
British efforts to impose their own advisor with controls over Qatar’s budget went even further 
than in Bahrain and Kuwait but were much less successful due to push back from the royal family. This is 
reflected in the fact that, even after the first such budget of Qatar was produced in 1950/51, over 40 
percent of the total budget was allocated to the royal family (AlShehabi 2017). The pressures of the 
                                                          
1 This is not to say that Kuwait’s system immediately after independence was perfect. Indeed, as AlShehabi (2017) 
indicates, an important omission was the absence of regulations on land purchases by the government which could 
be allocated to influential people including members of the royal family. Over the period 1953-1970 these land 
purchases amounted to over 20 percent of total revenues.  
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various different families within the royal family to receive their share of the budget and government 
posts became increasingly clear. Lying behind this may have been that several different family members 
were well-armed and commonly made armed threats if the oil funds were not sufficiently shared among 
royal family members (Crystal, 1990). Not surprisingly, therefore, even a few years later (1958) another 
British agent reported that the Al Thani clan’s share in oil revenues had climbed to 45 percent (Herb, 
1999).   
It is impossible to overstate the importance of the rulers in the region in upholding the 
“authoritarian bargain” in their budgetary decisions. They offered their citizens public goods and jobs in 
return for their willingness to allow the sovereigns to manage their oil and other revenues and to run the 
affairs of government without interference. The case of Abu Dhabi may serve as an important example of 
the growing consensus among monarchies in the GCC region of the need to commit some of their oil 
resources to long term development objectives and the welfare of their citizens. Oil was discovered in 
Abu Dhabi in 1958 and five years later it was being exported (Shemirani, 2011). However, the Amir of Abu 
Dhabi at the time, Sheikh Shakhbut bin Sultan Al-Nahyan, refused to spend the oil revenues, fearing that 
doing so would undermine the country’s traditional social fabric and lead to social instability. All other 
members of the Al Nahyan family, on the other hand, believed that change was both important and 
inevitable, and together with the backing of the British suggested that he would abdicate (Zahlan, 1998).  
He stepped down in 1966 and was immediately replaced by his younger brother Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan 
Al Nahyan, who a few years later went on to push for the establishment of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) 
and became the first president of the Emirates. Just before independence and the creation of the UAE in 
December 1971, Sheikh Zayed created the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC), and not long 
thereafter, its currently very large Sovereign Wealth Fund, the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA).   
 From the 1950s to the 1970s, the external influence of colonial powers in at least the budgetary 
process and governance waned in the region and was followed by nationalization of oil companies. 
Moreover, the foundation of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1960 by 
Iran, Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia (in addition to Venezuela) led to the coordination of policies and 
weakening the unity of the large international oil companies by (among other things) prohibiting any 
company which was in a dispute with any OPEC member government from increasing production in any 
other OPEC country (Rustow, 1983).   
Since the 1980s, while the GCC and other oil endowed Arab countries in the region have managed to 
ramp up production significantly and thereby securing significant oil revenues, they have had very mixed 
success in improving their budgetary and fiscal institutions. See, for instance, AlShehabi (2017) for the 
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GCC in general, Suliman (2018) for Sudan, El-Enbaby and Selim (2018) for Bahrain, and Soto (2018) for 
the UAE, as well as Eid (2015) for Saudi Arabia, Benbouziane  and  ElHannani (2015) for Algeria, Al-
Mejren (2015) for Kuwait, and Al Said and Al Foori (2016) for Oman 
This section has shown that weak institutions have predated the discovery of oil. The latter has 
greatly lowered the incentive in RRAEs to develop the kinds of democratic and legal institutions that 
have emerged elsewhere; such as the introduction of income and corporate taxation in other emerging 
and developing countries. However, what this historical section makes clear is that because of their 
small populations and reliance on revenues in the form of import duties, fees on religious pilgrims, GCC 
countries have never had that incentive, not just after the coming of oil.  
 
3. The Challenges: Shortcomings in Oil Revenue Management   
RREs in developed and democratic countries face many of the same challenges as the RRAEs, such as 
volatility of their public revenues and the need for generating non-oil tax revenues to reduce volatility 
and pro-cyclicality of government spending (Cavalcanti et al, 2015). Yet, treating the same challenges 
can be much more challenging in Arab RREs, because of (1) the much weaker incentives to develop the 
kinds of institutions which would allow income or corporate taxes to be developed, (2) the lack of 
transparency in their budgeting and governmental decision-making, and (3) the fact that many other 
markets and institutions function less well. Hence, in general not only are the challenges greater but 
they are also more multifaceted and numerous in RRAEs. Below we discuss the most important 
challenges for the RRAEs identified in Mohaddes et al. (2018) as well as in the broader literature.   
 
3.1 Accounting for the Transfer of Oil Revenues to the Government 
In most RRAEs, where the national governments are the owners of oil and therefore entitled to its 
revenues (at least since the early 1970s), the reporting of oil sales normally takes the form of a report on 
the sales flow from the oil companies (usually state companies) to the state treasury (Devlin, 2010, Ch 4, 
Ross, 2012, and Anderson and Ross, 2014). If such accounting is incomplete or otherwise deficient, 
however, this may give rise to substantial amounts of missing funds which may signal illicit capital 
outflows and corruption. Global Financial Integrity has conducted an exercise showing that there have 
indeed been substantial shortfalls in oil revenues making their way into the general budgets of RRAEs; 
see, for instance, Kar and Freitas (2011). They revealed large and rapidly growing illicit financial outflows 
over the 2000-2008 period in the Arab region. Indeed, the accumulated values of these “illicit outflows” 
in Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait and Qatar were identified as the 4th, 6th, 7th, and 12th largest in the world, 
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respectively. While these flows simply reflect unrecorded transactions, and cannot prove corruption by 
specific agents, at a minimum, as Kar and Freitas (2011) noted, they point to the incomplete accounting 
of transactions between oil companies and host governments. The clear implication is that the missing 
funds are not used to fund public goods like health and education or to achieve economic growth and 
diversification.  
In an effort to detect these illicit flows and also to reduce, or even eliminate them, the 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) was created to promote open and rigorous accounting 
standards around the world, especially in resource exporting countries. It primarily relies on voluntary 
cooperation between governments, private companies, and civil society to enhance transparency in the 
oil and mining sectors. Membership of EITI is granted, conditional on the country’s willingness to 
commit to open and rigorous accounting standards – especially on all transactions between oil and 
mineral extracting companies and governments – and to submit its accounts to the EITI for its own 
assessment of adherence to the commonly accepted standards of the organization. To come up with 
these standards, EITI has brought together the relevant stakeholders in the industry (oil and gas 
companies and investors, governments, and civil society). While over 50 different RREs have at some 
stage joined the EITI, some of them have withdrawn and not all the remaining members are considered 
to be compliant with the standards. In fact, only 51 countries are progressing to meet the 2016 EITI 
standards, with Iraq currently being the only Arab RRE, although it has so far (according to the EITI) 
made “inadequate progress”.  
To help identify the factors giving rise to these missing funds and poor utilization thereof, one 
can make use of Natural Resource Governance Institute’s (NRGI) Resource Governance Index, which 
evaluates the relevant state resource and related companies in each natural resource country, based on 
several different indicators and each of these on a number of sub-indicators. At first, its country 
coverage was quite limited, but by 2013, it covered 58 oil and gas countries, including 10 from the 
MENA region. The first column of Table 1 presents the 2013 Overall Resource Governance Index for both 
the ten MENA countries rated in that year and a somewhat representative sample of non-MENA major 
oil and gas countries. With the exception of Turkmenistan (the country with the lowest score on the 
index) one can see that the oil and gas institutions in most non-MENA countries were ranked well above 
the corresponding institutions of MENA countries, even though many of the former were located in 
underdeveloped regions of Africa and Latin America. 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
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By 2017 the NRGI increased the country coverage of oil and gas institutions in the MENA region 
to 14 countries. Although the construction of the indices over the two different years was by no means 
identical, there were substantial similarities. To facilitate possible comparison, in the second column of 
Table 1 we present the country scores on the Overall Resource Governance Index for 2017 for both the 
14 MENA countries and the same subsample of non-MENA countries. Among the MENA countries, the 
Overall Index increased between 2013 and 2017 for Iran and especially for Kuwait and Qatar, but fell 
modestly for Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, and more substantially for Yemen, but not to the same extent as 
Venezuela’s Overall Index did among non-MENA countries.   
In the next two columns of Table 1 we report the two most important components of the 2017 
Overall Index, namely those for Value Realization, which mainly deals with the sales side of oil and gas, 
and of the policies and mechanisms used in selling, and Revenue Management, which as its heading 
suggests is the most relevant one to the budgetary and fiscal management focus of this paper. Note that 
with the minor exceptions of Iran, Iraq, Libya and Sudan among the MENA countries, the scores on the 
Revenue Management component are lower than those on the Overall Index for 2017, often by a 
considerable margin. Yet, this patterns of relatively poorer scores on the Revenue Management 
Component is much less obvious among the sample of non-MENA countries.  
The final two columns in Table 1 report the 2017 governance scores for the leading state-owned 
natural resource company and for the major Sovereign Wealth Funds in each country. The scores in 
these (and all the other) columns of the table are based on a 0-100 scale, with 75 and above rated as 
“good”, 60-74 as “satisfactory” and those below 30 as “Failing”. The entries in the relevant columns of 
Table 1 imply that not a single MENA country attained a “satisfactory” or “good” rating on either the 
Overall Index or the Revenue Management component in 2017 and at most three MENA countries did 
so in the State-Owned Enterprise or SWF categories. Likewise, eight of the 14 MENA countries were 
rated as “failing” in terms of Revenue Management.  The 2017 Resource Governance Index report states 
that much of the shortcomings on these two components were attributable to politically motivated 
investments, corruption and extreme opaqueness; to the extent that it is not clear who actually benefits 
from these investments. Therefore, this suggests that poor governance in the oil sector could help 
explain the substantial missing funds as reported by Kar and Freitas (2011) in the Global Financial 





3.2 Going Further into the Budgetary Institutions 
However, the Resource Governance Index relates primarily only to the accounting and transparency 
standards within the state oil companies and SWFs. Still more important may be what happens when 
the revenues are funneled into the national budgets of the RRAEs. Even more than the oil revenues 
within state companies, poor performance in national budgeting can be blamed on the lack of openness 
of the budgets at different stages in their development, ranging from proposal to execution, follow up 
and evaluation. While this may be a characteristic of many oil-exporting countries, the extreme lack of 
transparency seems especially prominent in the RRAEs and is seemingly traceable to the apparent 
sensitivity of the ruling families to information about the shares of revenues going to them, as well as 
their military and religious group allies.  
Table 2 presents sets of scores from the Open Budget Survey for several Arab oil exporters as 
well as (for comparison purposes) for some non-Arab oil countries over the years 2006 to 2017. Also 
presented are the unweighted averages for both sets of country groupings for each of the years.  
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
As shown in Table 2, in any given year, the average score for Arab RREs is only a fraction of that 
for the non-Arab oil exporting countries. While there seems to be some narrowing of the gap in average 
scores between the two sets of countries between 2008 and 2015, between 2015 and 2017 that gap 
widened again, as a result of the plummeting scores on the Open Budget Index for Algeria, Sudan and 
Yemen between these two years. Moreover, outside of Yemen (before that country’s deterioration into 
what is often referred to as a failed state in the last couple of years), no other Arab oil exporting country 
has had its Open Budget Index score exceeded that of the non-Arab exporters except Equatorial Guinea. 
Although Algeria, Sudan and Yemen had all shown considerable improvement in their scores between 
2008 and 2015, there was no improvement in the scores of Iraq, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, and for the 
remaining Arab oil exporters, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, and UAE, the information was seemingly 
insufficient to even allow them to be scored.  
Given the emphasis on transparency and accessibility in the Open Budget Index, without going 
into all the different indices for democracy, political rights and civil liberties, it should be clear that much 
of the differences in scores between Arab and non-Arab oil exporting countries on this index can be 
attributed to the much lower scores of RRAEs on these various measures of democratic institutions. 
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Minor exceptions to the lower scores of the RRAEs than those of non-Arab oil exporters are Equatorial 
Guinea and to a lesser extent Angola, Azerbaijan and in the last couple of years also Venezuela. 
 
3.3 Shortcomings in the Construction, Use and Composition of Budgets 
Next, we identify five additional and important shortcomings in the construction and use of budgets and 
related fiscal institutions in RRAEs. The first such shortcoming is that budgets are formulated on an 
annual basis. Only with multi-year budgets can the fiscal authorities be in position to adjust a future 
year’s budgetary expenditure caps downward to compensate for fiscal shocks in the current fiscal year 
such as one coming from an oil price shock. Aside from facilitating counter-cyclical policies, multi-year 
budgets can also allow the authorities to maintain short-term stability without losing focus on the 
attainment of long-term objectives. This failure to integrate single year with multi-year budgeting into 
the same budgeting system has been repeatedly brought up by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
in its consultations with Kuwait and Oman (International Monetary Fund 2013, Al-Mejren, 2016, and Al-
Said and Al-Foori, 2016).  
Another major factor contributing to the pro-cyclicality in the RRAEs is the dearth of non-oil 
taxation in the form of individual, corporate income, and value-added taxation, the receipts of which 
tend to be highly pro-cyclical, thereby reducing the pro-cyclicality of incomes net of taxes. Section 2 has 
indicated that in RRAEs this has by no means been limited to their experience after the discovery of oil. 
Table 3 presents data taken from the IMF’s Government Financial Statistics showing the shares of tax 
revenues in both GDP and total public revenue for several oil exporting countries of the MENA region 
and for Norway. Note that whereas in Norway the share of tax revenue in GDP is well over 20% and that 
in total public revenue is over 50%, among the oil exporters of the MENA region, the only countries with 
tax shares exceeding or even coming near to those of Norway are Algeria and Qatar. In these two cases, 
however, the tax shares are artificially inflated by the fact that the oil revenues are treated as either 
taxes on oil corporations (as in Qatar) or taxes on goods and services produced by oil companies (as in 
Algeria).2 Indeed, after one accounts for the entries in the last column, one can see that non-oil tax 
revenues are negligible in all MENA oil exporters, implying that no RRAE has taken advantage of this 
potentially very useful means of reducing pro-cyclicality (and diversifying revenue streams).  
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
                                                          
2 Even though Oman has maintained a corporate tax rate of 10% on both domestic and foreign firms since the 
1970s, as indicated in Table 3 these still do not account for a substantial share of total revenues. 
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 While pro-cyclicality can adversely affect individual welfare and business conditions in a number 
of ways, one important sign of such harm is the tendency for bankruptcies to rise in oil-exporting 
countries in the years of sharp reductions in economic activity immediately after negative oil price 
shocks. As a proxy for bankruptcies, in Table 4 we present the changes in the percentages of banks non-
performing loans in total gross loans outstanding before and after two important oil price changes in the 
last two decades, namely 2008-9 and 2014-2016 (or 2013-2015 when 2014-6 data was not available). 
Given the scarcity of data on non-performing loans on a comparable basis in RRAEs, in this case, we 
draw more heavily on other oil exporting countries for which this data is available. Certainly, many other 
factors besides pro-cyclicality and oil price declines can be responsible for the increasing percentages of 
banks non-performing loans in the years identified. Note, however, the tendency for them to rise (in 
many cases quite substantially) in most oil exporting countries (five of the six cases among Arab oil 
exporters and 16 of the 20 non-Arab oil exporters) while for the world as a whole in 2014-2016 that 
percentage declined, suggesting that this could indeed be an important consequence of the volatility of 
oil rents and the absence of countercyclical fiscal policies. The plausibility of such a connection is 
indicated by the fact that increases in non-performing loan percentages were much smaller or even non-
existent in counties like Norway and Mexico which had a higher score on the Open Budget Index or 
higher percentages of non-oil tax revenues than the other oil exporters in Table 4 (or both). 
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
  The second important shortcoming in the budgetary processes of RRAEs we identify concerns 
the composition of expenditures in their budgets which strongly reflects the attempt of the rulers to 
satisfy the perceived social contract with their citizens. The political economy literature predicts that, 
when government accountability is lacking, resource booms induce politicians to expand very visible 
public sector employment (Robinson et al., 2006). As argued by Malik (2018), budgets become a tool for 
distributing oil wealth to the privileged elites rather than to the poor or future generations. In practice, 
budgets in the GCC have allocated significant (and excessive) portions of current public spending to 
these elites in the form of high paying jobs and subsidies (Galal and Selim, 2013). Ali and Elbadawi 
(2016) show that the provision of well-remunerated public-sector jobs can constitute an affordable, 
though unfortunately only very short-run, measure for RRAE rulers to remove the incentive to revolt.  
For example, countries like Kuwait and Qatar employ around two-thirds of their nationals in the 
public sector, and Saudi Arabia, Oman and Bahrain only a bit less than 50 percent (IMF 2013). Hodson 
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(2013) describes these jobs as lifetime employment, paying high wages and generous fringe benefits 
while entailing short working hours. The average salary of a Saudi civil servant is three times the average 
wage for Saudis in the private sector. Pension packages are also generous (Al-Sheikh and Erbas, 2016). 
This has skewed the preferences of Saudi workers sharply toward government employment (which is 
much less productive), making it difficult for private employers to attract Saudis, and serving as a 
disincentive for nationals to invest in the skills demanded by private employers.  
Especially distortionary has been the tendency in the wake of Arab Spring uprisings (in other 
Arab countries) for RRAE leaders to make sudden commitments to large increases in wages and/or of 
employment levels of nationals in the public sector. For example, Qatar’s Decree 50 of 2011 issued by its 
monarch dictated that social allowances and pensions of civil service employees and military officers 
should suddenly rise by 60 and 120 percent, respectively. 
 In addition, citizens in the GCC are provided free healthcare, education and social security. 
While these transfers increase citizen welfare, since they are politically motivated, without any checks 
and balances, leaders (often the sovereigns themselves) are able to increase spending irrespective of 
existing budgetary procedures. 
An unfortunate characteristic of subsidies, be they on fuel, housing, electricity and other items, is 
that they tend to be increased rather automatically with oil prices, irrespective of budgetary procedures. 
Table 5 (from Clements et al., 2013 and Coady et al., 2015) demonstrates, the large size of fuel subsidies 
in RRAEs in those years by comparing the pump price for a liter of gasoline in some of these countries 
with what they were in three European countries (Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway) which can 
serve as at least a crude benchmark for international prices. To provide a rough idea of their importance 
in the economy as a whole, it then divides these by GDP. As can be seen from the last two columns of 
Table 5, the fuel subsidies are generally quite large relative to their respective education budgets. While 
from the figures for the European countries one can see that the gasoline prices at the pump more or 
less doubled between 1995 and 2012 as oil prices went up sharply, those for several Arab oil exporters 
(especially Algeria, Libya and since 2000 also Saudi Arabia) actually fell.3  
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
                                                          
3  Note that prior to 2012, Iran was the country with the lowest price of gasoline at the pump ($0.10 per liter). 
14 
Fuel subsidies in RRAEs (as well as elsewhere) are sometimes defended as a means of preventing 
poor people from being pushed below the poverty line by higher oil prices. Yet, the detailed studies in 
Clements et al. (2013) and others typically show that, in fact, most of the benefits of these subsidies are 
captured by people with high incomes.4 Note also that there are many more efficient ways of reducing 
poverty than through general fuel subsidies.  
Still another harm imposed on RRAEs by heavy use of fuel subsidies derives from their distortion 
of relative prices. For example, these subsidies discourage investments in the energy sector which 
otherwise could have increased the efficiency of extraction, refining and transport. This relative price 
distortion also primarily benefits capital-intensive industries that use energy intensively at the expense 
of labor-intensive activities that could generate more employment to meet the growing problems of 
unemployment among nationals in the region. By artificially increasing the domestic demand for fuel, 
these fuel subsidies also limit the total amount of fuel available for export and accelerate natural 
resource depletion. 
The third unfortunate shortcoming of the budgetary systems of RRAEs we wish to note is that 
actual expenditures have tended to exceed budgeted ones in most categories, and especially in 
subsidies, transfer payments, and government expenses on wages and salaries. Much of this seems to 
be politically driven, as it has been especially common in countries like Kuwait and Oman where the 
parliaments play a large role in the budgetary process, and before elections as in Algeria and Oman (Al-
Mejren 2015, Al Said and Al Foori, 2016, and Benbouziane and Elhani, 2016). 
The fourth additional shortcoming in RRAE budgets is their insufficient comprehensiveness. 
Although varying somewhat from country to country, commonly omitted are the revenue and 
expenditure of the military, the royal families, or other important government services such as the 
police and foreign service, national oil companies and other state-owned enterprises.5 Since many of 
these excluded items are large and volatile, their exclusion severely limits the ability of budgetary 
authorities to manage, monitor, and impose discipline over government spending and thereby to 
achieve stabilization, decrease volatility and cyclicality, and to evaluate the efficiency of such 
expenditures and their allocation. Since some of these expenditures are often unusually high, their 
exclusion from many of the RRAE budgets greatly limits the relevance and usefulness of these budgets 
                                                          
4 For example, according to the International Monetary Fund (2014, p.2) “…in Sudan, the poorest 20% of the 
population receives only about 3% of fuel subsidies, whereas the richest 20% captures more than 50%.” 
5 Malik (2018) mentions that even the gigantic Saudi Aramco budgetary figures are not included in the Saudi 
national budget. For Yemen, see De la Torre (2008).  
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and prevents the broader public from learning how large such expenditures really are (Benbouziane and 
and Elhanani, 2016).  
Even more common in their exclusion from RRAE budgets are what are commonly referred to as 
government related entities (GREs). These include government enterprises which, even when not 
included in the budgets, can upset the country’s finances by suddenly requiring issuance of substantial 
debt or having to be bailed out by the government through non-budgetary expenditures. As Soto (2018) 
describes, in the UAE the magnitudes of deficit spending of this type can be very high, and their 
exclusion prevents these expenses from being constrained by the central budgetary authorities.  
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
          When military expenditures are excluded from the budgets of RRAEs, this can be a very serious 
omission since as shown in Table 6, they are for many such countries quite large. More specifically, this 
table shows the average shares of military expenditures in GDP for Norway, followed by ten large RRAEs 
and five smaller ones for 1990-99, 2000-06, and 2007-2014. It is based on data from the leading 
international source of such statistics, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. As a 
member of NATO, Norway is not surprisingly committed to allocating a non-negligible portion of its GDP 
to military expenditures. Yet, even though not required to contribute to NATO or any equivalent 
regional scheme, notice that not a single one of the other 15 countries in Table 6 has a lower share of 
military expenditures in GDP than Norway in any of the periods. While the high share of Kuwait during 
the 1990s is understandable because of its invasion by Iraq, it is hard to see why the other RRAEs should 
have military shares in excess of those of Norway. Indeed, in several cases and especially in the more 
recent periods of high oil prices, their military shares in GDP have been several times as high as those of 
Norway. A major reason for the emphasis on these countries on military is believed to be the heavy 
reliance of the autocratic leaders on support from the military and also their attempt by military 
strength to generate a feeling of national pride and security in the citizenry.  
Table 6 also reports the shares of Military arms in total imports. One of the reasons for including 
these figures is the widespread acceptance among scholars, especially of the Middle East (Askari 2006, 
Askari et al. 2009 and Askari 2012) that arms imports are often a quite secretive and convenient means 
of hiding illicit transfers. The table shows that, at least for the period of comparatively high oil prices 
after 2000, each of the RRAEs except Iran (which was under international sanctions) had shares of 
military arms in total imports considerably larger than those of Norway. This could well be indicative of 
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military imports serving as a means of concealing both illicit transfers and excessive government 
expenditures.  
The final important shortcoming in government budgeting in RRAEs we wish to point to is that 
commodity booms often lead to lower quality/inefficient public investments and other budgetary 
expenditures, calling attention to insufficient evaluation of public spending, including investment 
spending. Devarajan (2018) traces inefficient public spending in RRAEs to weak government 
accountability for oil revenues. The ensuing lack of transparency provides insufficient incentives for 
citizens to scrutinize how their governments spend their oil revenues, providing these governments with 
greater leeway in spending, often resulting in waste and fraud. Wasteful spending often takes the form 
of “white elephants”, investment projects with negative social surplus, which are used as a means of 
inefficient redistribution aimed at artificially raising popular support for existing leaders (Robinson et al., 
2006), or public enterprises which are either not sustainable or sustainable only with large subsidies. In 
many cases also, the inefficiency of investments may be the result of weak administrative systems and 
limited ability to scale-up expenditures rapidly and to monitor and evaluate projects. This is likely to be 
especially common in the poorer Arab oil economies of Yemen and Sudan as suggested by Suliman 
(2018).  
One of the most obvious examples of inefficiency in investment allocations reflecting the absence 
of appropriate program evaluation was the huge infrastructural and heavy industry public investment 
program undertaken by Algeria in the 1970s. As Auty (2003) has documented, the economic returns on 
these investments were extremely low. Not only were the Algerian investments extremely capital-
intensive, and thereby unable to create the jobs that were needed at this time of high unemployment, 
but also many of the firms invested in were left with negative profits and accumulating debts which 
were in turn rolled over by state-owned banks. This had the effect of discouraging private investment in 
both the banking industry and the private sector more generally, indirectly contributing to negative real 
interest rates over much of the period that induced insufficiency in saving and inefficiency in the use of 
capital.  
 
4. Policy Recommendations  
In view of the numerous and often severe challenges posed by the existing problems in government 
budgeting and fiscal institutions, the purpose of this section is to identify several important policy 
reforms designed to help these Arab oil exporting countries overcome these shortcomings and thereby 
to render fiscal policy more effective. The desired timetable for these reforms may depend heavily on 
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the circumstances of the individual country, on the character of the specific reform, and on the price of 
oil at the time. However, given the seriousness of some of the threats to the financial sustainability of 
public budgets and income growth resulting from these fiscal shortcomings in the current era when oil 
prices are substantially lower than in the pre-2014 period and thereby limiting economic growth in the 
region (Mohaddes and Raissi, 2018), early action would seem warranted in most cases. 
Since the resource-rich countries which have adopted desired policy reforms have for the most 
part been democratic countries like Canada, Chile, and Norway, some may argue that the suggested 
reforms are only likely to be feasible once substantial democratization and other political reforms have 
taken place. Yet, we believe that even short of such deep-seated institutional reforms, good leaders may 
have incentives to make these reforms even in the absence of deep-seated political reform. For 
example, as Caselli and Cunningham (2009) suggest, the leaders may do so once they see it in their long-
term interest to sacrifice their monopoly on information and control in order to make the necessary 
reforms. When these reforms are carried out efficiently, the sizes of their respective economies may be 
increased by transforming natural capital into physical and human capital and thereby diversifying their 
economies and lowering volatility. In line with this view, the first recommended reform is to open up 
budgets to greater transparency.   
 
 4.1 Budgetary Information and Transparency 
As described earlier, all RRAEs continue to suffer from shortcomings in the availability and transparency 
of budgetary data and operations. In order to hold policymakers accountable and to strengthen 
governance, the public (particularly parliament and civil society organizations) needs information on 
how oil resources are generated and then spent (or saved). Continued action to enhance transparency 
and accountability in the oil sector will therefore help to further strengthen governance, enhance 
budgetary execution and direct budgetary resources toward priority needs. Since there are many ways 
in which the budgets are at present incomplete and non-transparent, several somewhat different 
reforms of this type are suggested below. 
First, is the need to integrate into the budgetary accounts all sources of revenue and 
expenditure, some of which are at present off-budget, but large in size and therefore important for both 
transparency and comprehensiveness purposes. Fiscal transparency in the collection and utilization of 
natural resource revenues through appropriate accounting, reporting, and auditing is important. To this 
end, RRAEs need to follow good practices, including a clear assignment of roles and responsibilities of 
different government entities, establishing an open budget process and making budgetary information 
18 
publicly available. A useful starting point to address this problem would be for the oil exporters to join 
EITI and to follow its recommendations and those of the Natural Resource Governance Institute to 
assure that more of the oil revenues actually make their way into the budgets.6 Even more important 
and general, however, is the need to assure inclusion of the aforementioned often excluded types of 
expenditures. 
Several specific strategies may be followed to bring about inclusion and disclosure. One obvious 
way to do so is to make very explicit the comprehensiveness of all that should be included in the 
budgets. Then, the budgetary and other fiscal information should be made much more fully available so 
that more individuals can easily identify budgetary items which should be in those budgets but cannot 
be found. This should be followed by imposing stiff penalties on those organizations and agents which 
do not comply. The inclusion and disclosure of such information as military expenditures, subsidies and 
public enterprise expenditures should also discourage excessive expenditures in these categories that, 
as noted above, are often associated with inefficiency and corruption.  
A second supplementary strategy is to implement a participatory approach in the process of 
budgetary review. This could include professional budgetary evaluation and auditing agencies, including 
ones independent of the executive branch of government, and some perhaps external to the country, 
such as a regional council of finance ministers, or a relevant professional research organization. While 
this could also be done by a legislature, as Posner and Park (2006) have shown, this may not necessarily 
bring greater responsibility in budgetary management. Indeed, as shown in the case of Bahrain by El-
Enbaby and Selim (2018), when legislatures are allowed to participate in budgetary decisions, intra-
legislature conflict can contribute to a proliferation of expenditures over and above the budgeted 
amounts to please these competing constituencies.  This can be controlled, at least to some extent, by 
maintaining hierarchy in budgetary formation.  
A third useful strategy is to cooperate fully and participate in the Open Budget Surveys which 
provide incentives for maximum comprehensiveness of the budget and full disclosure. Moreover, peer 
members of these surveys and their advisors at relevant international organizations such as the IMF, 
World Bank and other agencies, can offer advice to fiscal authorities in the RRAEs on how to improve 
the comprehensiveness of their budgets and their evaluations of the expenditures they have made. 
These same pressures should also contribute to reducing inefficient government consumption 
                                                          
6  We do not mean to suggest that doing so is likely to bring about a quick improvement in budgetary or other 
performance as suggested by Sovacool et al (2016). 
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expenditures and increasing the allocations deemed useful to efficient human and physical capital 
accumulation.   
 
4.2 Sovereign Wealth Funds  
While many Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) have been in existence for over half a century (such as the 
Kuwait Investment Authority which was founded in 1953), a large number of funds have been 
established (by major commodity exporters in particular) over the last two decades. These SWFs 
accumulated large assets during the most recent oil-price boom (2002-2008), have played a major role 
in reserve management of commodity revenues, and contributed to macroeconomic stabilization in 
several cases. SWFs have been established for a variety of reasons, ranging from fiscal stabilization (that 
is to help smooth the impact on government spending of revenues that are large and volatile), to long-
term saving for future needs of the economy, or of specific groups such as pensioners, or for future 
generations. One of the main short-term objectives of SWFs is to counter the adverse macroeconomic 
effects of commodity price volatility and as such they represent a potentially important vehicle for 
mitigating pro-cyclical fiscal policy (e.g. Aizenman and Glick, 2008, Elbadawi et al., 2017, and Mohaddes 
and Raissi, 2017).  
Yet, thus far at least, many of the SWFs in Arab countries seem not to have lived up to their full 
potential; see, for instance, Bazoobandi and Nugent (2017). Once again, data shortcomings on SWFs 
remain a severe barrier to properly evaluating their quality, making it impossible to compare the 
different SWFs, and to make accurate assessments of the effects of qualitative differences among them. 
Not to mention that different Arab countries may at any point in time find themselves in quite different 
situations, justifying that their SWFs adopt quite different investment objectives (such as intertemporal 
equity, or attraction of foreign FDI, or generating local business complexes for employment generation 
to mention a few). Nevertheless, one important step for some of the weaker RRAE SWFs would be to 
strengthen their staff, organize them so as to focus on the particular objectives of their respective SWFs. 
Another is to make available sufficient information on their investments, the bases of their evaluation of 
investment targets, and to demonstrate their adherence to international standards put forward by the 
International Forum for Sovereign Wealth Funds. This should allow them to be rated by SWF evaluators 
such as in the Transparency Index of Linaburg and Maduell (LM) which is reported widely by the 
Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute and the SWF Scoreboard (Bagnall and Truman, 2014 and Truman, 
2013).   
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Overall, the RRAEs need to improve the management of volatility in resource income by better 
utilizing forward-looking institutions such as Sovereign Wealth Funds or adopting short-term 
mechanisms such as stabilization funds, for instance, by saving more aggressively when oil prices are 
high and spending accumulated revenues when prices are low. More importantly perhaps, the 
government can use these vehicles to intervene in the economy by increasing public capital expenditure 
when private investment is low. Alternatively, the government can use these funds to increase the 
complementarities of physical and human capital, such as improving the judicial system, property rights, 
and human capital. This would increase the returns on investment with positive effects on capital 
accumulation, total factor productivity, and growth.  
 
4.3  Fiscal Rules and Other Policies for Dealing with Procyclicality and Other Challenges 
The adoption of fiscal rules can help contain year-to-year fluctuations in resource prices and thus 
contribute to smoothing revenues and putting upper bounds on increases in spending when oil prices 
are high. In addition, they could potentially mitigate discretionary interventions by governments (Daniel 
et al. 2013) and very importantly mitigate fiscal pro-cyclicality. In practice, the adoption of a fiscal rule 
would require larger fractions of oil revenues to be siphoned off from the budget into a “rainy-day” fund 
when oil prices are above some threshold, and funds poured into the budget from the rainy-day fund 
when oil prices are below this threshold.  As discussed above, the Sovereign Wealth Funds that most 
RRAEs have established, if properly managed, should offer convenient as well as suitable locations into 
which oil revenues (above a designated threshold) could be deposited. 
The number of countries across the world adopting fiscal rules is said by the IMF to have grown 
considerably from a small set of 10 countries in 1990 to 30 in 2001 and 51 in 2009, a majority of which 
are developing or transition economies (International Monetary Fund, 2009). Yet, to date, not a single 
Arab country has both adopted and retained anything that could be regarded as a fiscal rule. Therefore, 
the recommendation that RRAEs adopt appropriate fiscal rules should be treated as a high priority and 
long overdue. Naturally, the nature of the fiscal rule should be tailored to the circumstances of the 
individual country. For instance, Devarajan et al. (2014) provide a nice example of how an appropriate 
set of rules might be selected. 
GCC countries would benefit from setting a target for the structural budget balance based on an 
estimate of the long-term oil price. This indicator would net out the cyclical impact of the level of 
economic activity and hydrocarbon prices that affect central government income. Thus, the structural 
balance equals structural revenues plus interest on net government assets minus actual expenditures on 
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goods and services. It therefore reflects the financial balances that the central government would have 
achieved if that country’s GDP had been at its trend level and hydrocarbon prices had been at their long-
term level. Qatar is the first GCC economy to have initiated steps to formally adopt a medium-term 
budget framework to enhance the predictability of spending decisions and link its medium-term 
development plans to the budget. Nevertheless, even Qatar has yet to implement such a scheme. 
Countries like Yemen and Sudan have shorter resource horizons and greater uncertainty about 
production volumes, with drastic implications on the sustainability of their public spending once 
resources are depleted. In addition, they need to accumulate broader domestic capital bases with which 
to achieve savings for the future. These countries could benefit from setting a target for the non-
resource fiscal balance (which is an indicator of the capacity of the economy to absorb the resource 
revenues without causing inflation and a large current account deficit) at a level that can be maintained 
after their resource are depleted. This would avoid the need for abrupt breaks in government 
expenditures or tax increases after the natural resources have been depleted, given that the non-
resource fiscal balance gradually converges to the overall balance as resource revenues decline (Daniel 
et al., 2013). 
 In more concrete terms, one suggestion is that a regional board of Finance Ministers and other 
fiscal analysts could contribute to the adoption of fiscal rules, perhaps also encouraged by a regional 
organization such as the Arab Fund or the GCC. There seems to be considerable scope for better 
coordination of fiscal decision making and in laying down fiscal rules and policies not only across, but 
also within, the countries of the region. As noted by Soto (2018), coordination among the individual 
Emirates of the UAE within a more formal and comprehensive federal government could serve as a 
means of coordinating their actions and avoiding the undesirable consequences that have arisen when 
coordination was lacking.  
In addition, Ter-Minassian (2010) lists seven other actions (a fiscal responsibility law, modern 
financial management, a multi-year planning horizon, rules for government asset and liability 
management, requirements on accountability and public information on the government’s financial 
management, effective control and auditing) that should be undertaken to  increase both the likelihood 
of fiscal rules being adopted and their effectiveness once adopted.7 Some of these have already been 
                                                          
7 Note also that Schmidt-Hebbel (2016) points to the Fiscal Responsibility Law that Chile adopted in 2006 and that 
served to provide a strong and more binding legal basis for the government to meet the specifications of the fiscal 
rule that it had adopted five years earlier. Other steps that Chile has taken include the development of two SWFs 
aimed specifically at decreasing volatility and putting a floor on the percentage of government savings to assure 
the sustainability of the country’s pension systems and putting the budget cycle on a four-year basis.   
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mentioned among our own recommended reforms. Along similar lines, but based on the extremely 
useful simulations of alternative rules to be used in existing SWFs by Alswellem et al. (2015a, 2015b), we 
also recommend the following five policies: (1) adopting a savings rate rule that (unlike Kuwait’s fixed 
rule or the lack of specific rules as in Saudi Arabia’s SAMA and Abu Dhabi’s ADIA) is highly progressive to 
the difference between the current world oil price and/or the country’s current level of extraction 
relative to that of the past average, such that all oil revenues attributable to an oil price above a 
relatively low benchmark price (of say $30 a barrel) be saved; 8 (2) invest in a diversified portfolio of high 
quality international assets in the form of equities and bonds (as both Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have 
done), although with a 70-30 split between these instead of the greater emphasis on more liquid but 
lower-return assets; (3) link the savings rule not only to oil revenues but also to returns on the foreign 
assets; (4) adjust the savings rate also to country-specific characteristics, such as the age distribution of 
its current work force, or absorptive capacity of its current population;9 and (5) lower the possibility of 
discretion or rule avoidance by keeping the rules simple and by introducing sharp distinctions in the 
roles assigned to the agents involved in different stages of SWF or budget design and implementation 
(such as in formulating the savings rule, enforcing it, doing the accounting, and choosing the 
investments).  
Short of establishing fiscal rules and the more comprehensive laws to assure adherence to the 
fiscal rules and to make them work, we provide the following three policy suggestions. 
 (a) Introducing (new) taxes. As noted above, since virtually all types of taxes have the desired 
effect of introducing some degree of counter-cyclicality, introducing income, corporation, sales and 
other taxes can be a useful means of reducing the unfortunate pro-cyclicality of existing budgetary 
systems in RRAEs and more importantly preparing them for life after oil. Admittedly, since absence of 
taxation is often a means that RRAEs use to attract FDI, this may be politically difficult. A nice example, 
however, of how this difficulty might be mitigated is the recent proposal by the IMF for the GCC as a 
whole to establish a value added tax (VAT) in all member states so that it would not be seen as 
discriminatory against business in one state if done only in that state. Such a tax could be made even 
more countercyclical by specifying that the tax rate vary over time with oil prices.  
In light of the longer-term concerns about declining oil revenues as a result of either depletion or 
falling oil prices, it is obvious that appropriate fiscal management in RREs must go well beyond 
                                                          
8 Such a rule is not only simple to apply and monitor but also has the greatest possible effect in reducing the pro-
cyclicality of government revenues and expenditures.  
9 The latter would suggest that the savings rate should be higher (or alternatively that the proceeds targeted to 
educational or other activities designed to overcome this shortcoming should be greater).  
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whichever tax may be the easiest to implement. Citizens must be convinced that tax revenues are 
necessary in order to maintain the quantity and quality of the public goods and services that they value. 
Citizens are more likely to accept such taxes if they can be convinced that tax collection is honest, that 
their allocation through the budget system is efficient and that their revenues will generate the desired 
public goods and services. This would demonstrate a fundamental ability of the state, and thereby put 
an end to one of the chief contributors to the oil curse. The key is to get citizens to realize that it is in the 
country’s interest to generate savings from revenues other than oil so as to make efficient investments 
for the future, both in the short run and in the long run (when oil is depleted). Income and corporation 
taxes are likely to be especially advantageous by being both progressive and countercyclical.  
        (b) Integrating short-term budgets with medium term ones and long-term development plans. To 
their credit, some countries have succeeded in linking and integrating their long-term development 
plans (such as “Vision 2030”) with their year-to-year budgeting. Yet, experience suggests that more can 
be done, for example, such that oil price increases occurring late in a given fiscal year can be used to 
trigger changes in budgets for the next several years in ways that may lower their pro-cyclicality. 
         (c) Making more use of federal and regional structures. As noted in Section 4.1, the UAE has a 
federal structure, but a very weak one in which each of its emirates is granted complete autonomy over 
its own fiscal policy. Since the budgets of some of its individual emirates vastly exceed that of the 
federal UAE government and these individual emirates vary enormously in terms of the amounts of oil 
and gas they possess, this has greatly aggravated the problems of achieving budgetary control in the 
UAE as a whole, making it harder to achieve fiscal stability and to reduce dependence on oil revenues. A 
stronger federal structure enhanced with maximum fiscal deficits in individual emirates and penalties 
for violating such maximums and the adoption of non-oil taxes could help avoid the problems that have 
affected the UAE. The same principle would apply at the country level by integrating them into a 
regional institution like the GCC and imposing fiscal deficit ceilings and other budgetary features on a 
GCC-wide basis. Since, there are a number of other countries in the world with federal structures in 
which the states or provinces also have budgets, the experience of these countries should be 
investigated to see more precisely when and how they have been successful in mitigating pro-cyclicality 
of natural resource rents and limiting risks.10  
 
 
                                                          
10 One such an example is Australia, wherein according to Jay (1977) this country’s Loan Council managed to curb 
the abilities of its individual states to undertake loans to finance large expenditures in any particular fiscal year. 
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4.4 Project and Program Evaluations 
To improve the efficiency of public spending, it is essential to have strong public financial management 
systems, including the abilities to provide reasonable forecasts of resource revenues, to undertake 
medium-term budgeting, and to identify fiscal risks on both the revenue and expenditure sides. An 
especially important need is the introduction of proper program evaluation methods to identify low 
productivity programs and expenditures, either prior to or soon after implementation, so that they can 
be either revised in ways to make them productive or terminated in a timely manner.   
There may of course be understandable factors underlying the dearth of careful evaluation 
studies. For instance, the insider nature of many of these investments and the heavy emphasis placed 
on the public sector may be a significant contributing factor. Such insiders do not want to delay 
implementation of their projects until their initial plans are fully analyzed and do not want information 
about their projects to be circulated to either potential competitors or the general public. But, given the 
increasing evidence of corruption in most countries of the region (see especially Nugent, 2011), insiders 
should be well aware of the fact that, when their uses of funds for certain public or private projects are 
neither fully disclosed nor evaluated, trust in them by the general public is likely to erode rapidly. For 
this reason, to remain in positions where they can exercise control over such resource allocation, honest 
insiders should realize that it is in their best interest to make their use of these funds transparently and 
subject to proper evaluations. Once the culture is changed in this respect, experience elsewhere has 
shown that such evaluations can be made compulsory, giving every ministry or firm responsible for such 
a project the responsibility to design, execute and audit the project in such a way as to justify future 
rewards of the right to receive funds for executing additional projects.11 
Another factor underlying insufficient project and program evaluation may be the absence of 
technical know-how and experience. Indeed, El-Enbaby and Selim (2018), Soto (2018), and Suliman 
(2018) have suggested that, in some countries at least, the currently existing auditing agencies and 
project evaluation units may be insufficient in one or more such respects. Fixing them should then be a 
high priority and in the meantime it might be useful to draw on international expertise.  
A final important recommendation, especially for projects in the public sector where there may 
exist a number of different ways to satisfy a single objective, is to make use of randomized control trials 
                                                          
11  For example, according to an interview by Jeff Nugent with Dr. Chung-Ming Kuan, a former Minister of the 
National Development Council of the Executive Yuan and Professor at National Taiwan University, this is what 
happened in Taiwan. From a situation in which earlier the various ministers were reluctant to have their projects 
properly evaluated, it eventually became the case that every ministry was eager to have all its projects reviewed 
and competently so as to demonstrate its worthiness to carry out additional development projects in the future.  
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(RCTs) to see which methods are most cost-effective. Similarly, where in practice the projects turn out to 
be less socially profitable than they were expected to be, they should be routinely re-investigated to 
identify specific shortcomings that could be rectified by revising the existing programs. The prompt 
rectification or revision of failing programs could go a long way to raising total factor productivity over 
time (which as shown in Soto (2018) for the UAE tends to be very low in RRAEs).  
 
4.5 Reducing Inefficient Public Expenditures 
In low-capacity and low-governance environments and to ensure that public spending is allocated 
towards high-quality public investment projects, a gradual increase in spending may be advisable for the 
more highly populated RRAEs, with an initial focus on investing resources to remove existing 
bottlenecks, a process sometimes called “investing in investing” (Collier, 2010). Yet, in view of the 
evidence cited in Section 2 concerning excessive and unjustified government spending on government 
salaries of nationals and subsidies, and indeed rising trends in these over time (at least until very 
recently),12 these politically motivated tendencies resulting from fears unrealistically instilled in leaders 
in the wake of Arab Spring events should be strongly resisted. Moreover, each of the following more 
specific objectives should be given priority attention. 
 (a) Controlling salaries for public sector employees, revising labor laws and stimulating 
competition. Policy makers need to be made cognizant of the fact that these high salaries of nationals in 
the public sector severely distort the local labor market, discouraging nationals from entering the 
private sector. Wages and salaries and benefits of nationals in government service should be limited to 
what their productivity justifies. Labor regulations should be changed so as to accomplish reduction in 
public sector wage rates and increase those of the private sector, thereby eliminating the need for the 
government to meet the demand for employment by young nationals by offering them unneeded 
government jobs at artificially high wage rates. Raising the wage rates in the private sector for highly 
trained nationals should both stimulate the desire for learning among young nationals and allow their 
employment in the private sector to constitute a strong and dependable source of technology upgrading 
and TFP growth.  
(b) Removing subsidies for fuel and housing. As demonstrated in Section 3 and Table 5, the costs 
of fuel subsidies in RRAEs are extremely high and have been estimated to be as high as 10% of GDP in 
Saudi Arabia, at least until recently. Removing such subsidies altogether, therefore, could go a long way 
                                                          
12 See also Askari (2006), Hertog (2011), Gray (2013), Hodson (2013) and Malik (2018).
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toward reducing the budgetary bias toward current consumption and the relative price distortions that 
increase pollution, environmental degradation, smuggling, and discrimination against labor–intensive 
activities.  Contrary to popular conception, removing these subsidies is not likely to increase inequality 
among the citizenry. The current period of low oil prices should make it much easier for RRAEs to reduce 
their subsidies.13 
(c) Reforming pensions and social insurance to make them sustainable. The rulers of Arab oil-
exporting countries have attempted to legitimize themselves at least in part also by subsidizing health 
insurance and long periods of retirement with generous pension programs. While at first, these were 
primarily for workers in the government sector, more recently these benefits have been extended to 
those few nationals working in the private sector. While insurance and pensions of these sorts are 
desirable, in most cases these programs are designed on the basis of unrealistically low mortality ages 
and allow for retirement at very young ages, rendering these programs vulnerable to large future cost 
overruns (Robalino and Bogomolova, 2006 and Whitehouse 2007). Such problems need to be taken care 
of immediately.14   
(d) Increasing employment of nationals in the private sector. Especially now that the private 
sector is beginning to be counted on to bring high technology and productivity to the non-oil sectors of 
the RRAEs, encouragement needs to be given to nationals to join the private sector. This should be 
accompanied by raising educational quality and skills development so as to raise productivity to make 
nationals more competitive for private sector hiring. The jobs should be both sufficiently numerous to 
absorb the rapidly growing number of nationals into the labor force and of sufficient quality to justify 
their higher wage rates and make use of their improving educational backgrounds.  
Programs to encourage entrepreneurship among nationals, the establishment of new types of 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), credit provision to SMEs, and labor training by firms can 
also foster private employment of more highly skilled workers.   
                                                          
13 See for example the IMF’s free online course on energy subsidy reform: https://www.edx.org/course/energy-
subsidy-reform-imfx-esrx-0.  
14 A useful example of a pension scheme which has been quite successful in making the adjustments in payment 
schedules and other rules for keeping the scheme sustainable over time is the system used by Japan’s Ministry of 
Health, Labor and Welfare. There, a highly professional commission is convened once every five years, comprised 
of care providers, the elderly, the working people paying the premiums, and the managers of the social security 
program. The regular five-year schedule makes both the involvement of all relevant stakeholder groups and 
adjustments to the rules less costly to arrange, and it also reduces the magnitude of the changes needed to keep 
the system solvent, efficient and sustainable on the basis of internally generated funds. At the same time it 
minimizes the risk of social conflicts among the relevant stakeholders. 
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Meanwhile, improving labor rights and working conditions for private sector workers could serve 
to reduce the widespread criticism of RRAEs in the rest of the world for the extreme lack of protection 
for foreign workers and for their inability to move from one employer to another. As a result, two 
initiatives that GCC countries as a whole might wish to consider are a tightening of regulations on the 
use of foreign workers and increasing the extent of competition in the private sector, by eliminating 
exclusive dealerships and other monopolistic features.15  
In the past, some of these countries have experimented with a variety of means to meet this 
challenge. For instance, efforts have been made to incentivize the private sector to employ nationals 
through subsidized credit, energy, water and other inputs. Another approach has been to restrict the 
inflow of foreign workers by adding taxes and fees to the hiring of such workers or alternatively to 
impose quotas on the use of foreign workers. Yet, as indicated above, because these jobs will need to be 
increasingly skilled and the workers embedded with an excellent work ethic, success in this respect is 
likely to require large improvements in the educational systems, labor law reforms, labor training by 
private employers, and very substantial improvement in the work ethic of educated nationals.16 Still 
another mechanism that might be useful would be to attract the kind of foreign investment that could 
fill in missing links in value chains within these countries and thereby substantially broaden and make 
internationally competitive industrial complexes such that they might sustain the productivity of higher 
wage private sector jobs that would be attractive to nationals. Notably, UNCTAD (2015) has provided an 
overall design of a comprehensive investment policy framework that would be broad enough to deal not 
only with these and other issues but also with environmental sustainability.  
 
5. Concluding Remarks: Going Beyond Fiscal Policy 
While the last several paragraphs have called for the need to revise labor regulations, most of our policy 
recommendations have been related to the need for fiscal reform. However, the ability to accomplish 
these objectives as well as to adopt favorable fiscal institutions and/or to increase their effectiveness so 
as to minimize the excessive volatility of government revenues and expenditures, rent-seeking, 
                                                          
15 Notably Ali and Elbadawi (2016) develop a political economy model giving existing rulers (or elites) alternative 
means of maintaining their position, repression via the military, or buying off the opposition with high public 
sector wage rates. They show that countries like Algeria with large populations would choose the first method 
whereas GCC countries with small populations would choose the second because fewer nationals would need to 
be paid.    
16 The extreme importance of this last requirement for success is emphasized by Peck (2014) in her analysis of 
Saudi Arabia’s Nitaqat Program.  
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corruption, the lack of transparency in the making, implementing and auditing of budgets, and the lack 
of proper program evaluation, may depend very heavily on a number of other institutions.  
Some notable progress has been made in identifying those particular institutions that seem to 
make these reforms feasible or especially effective, referred to as “stepping stones” in the terminology 
of North et al. (2009) and Besley and Persson (2011, 2014). However, existing studies differ on the 
identity of the institutions that are most important for improving fiscal management. Potential 
institutional reforms could involve stronger efforts to achieve central bank independence (as suggested 
by Selim, 2018), improving the rule of law, and various components of governance; including possibly 
government efficiency, political stability, and the extent of checks and balances (clearly, more research 
is warranted in terms of the latter). 
Furthermore, the current relatively low oil prices environment might present a good opportunity 
for the GCC and most other Arab oil exporters to revisit a number of policies including their exchange 
rate regimes. While there is evidence that resource-rich countries with fixed exchange regimes tend to 
perform systematically better than countries with other exchange rate regimes (Kamar and Soto, 2018), 
Elbadawi et al. (2018), have shown that the success of fixed rate regimes has still varied considerably, 
being most successful in those countries with international reserves above a certain threshold.  
Moreover, Frankel (2018) proposes that oil-exporting countries should peg their national currencies 
concurrently not only to a broader basket of currencies of major trading partners (including both the 
dollar and the euro) but also to the price of their major export commodity (in this case oil).  
In no way do we pretend to identify one or another among these various methods of improving 
fiscal management as an optimal means for the governments of RRAEs to provide jobs and investment 
opportunities for nationals as well as to maintain social stability and make their development 
sustainable in the long run. The lesson to be drawn from such concerns for fiscal management in 
resource-rich Arab economies is to indicate that the kind of fiscal management that will be needed to 
satisfy the multidimensional concerns (for fiscal sustainability, social stability, economic diversification, 
and good governance to mention but a few) is multi-faceted and complex. Piece-meal approaches are 
unlikely to be effective. Clearly, what is required is comprehensive reform in fiscal and related 
management programs, including deep-seated institutional reform. Only then, will growth and 



























MENA Countries       
Algeria 38 33 40 25 47 21 
Bahrain 47 39 27 26 32 32 
Egypt 43 39 45 30 36  
Iran 28 38 36 45 22 70 
Iraq 47 38 52 47 66  
Kuwait 41 54 44 51 65 61 
Libya 19 18 27 20 32 32 
Oman n.a. 50 32 43 32 47 
Qatar 26 43 33 19 55 4 
Saudi Arabia 34 36 23 24 27 18 
Sudan  n.a. 21 26 26 13  
Tunisia n.a. 56 60 40 66  
United Arab Emirates n.a. 42 33 16 27 21 
Yemen 43 30 50 28 40         
Other Countries       
Norway  98 86 77 84 80 90 
Azerbaijan 48 47 49 43 70 52 
Brazil 80 71 62 78 65  
Cameroon 34 54 59 70 52  
Canada 76 75 69 59  88 
Colombia 74 71 59 85 73 100 
Ecuador 58 54 51 58 56  
Ghana  63 67 65 65 75 93 
Indonesia 66 68 64 76 66  
Kazakhstan 57 56 53 54 63 67 
Mexico 77 61 64 54 74 45 
Nigeria  42 42 50 44 54 4 
Russia 56 45 47 40 56 40 
Trinidad and Tobago 74 64 64 57 75 74 
Turkmenistan 4 11 11 0 10  
Venezuela 56 33 48 34 58 22 
       
Source : Natural Resource Governance Institute, 2013 and 2017 Resource Governance Indices 




Table 2: Open Budget Index Scores of Arab and Non-Arab Oil Exporting Countries, 2006-
2017 
 
Country 2006 2008 2010 2012 2015 2017 
Arab Oil Exporters       
Algeria  2 1 13 19 3 
Bahrain       
Iraq   0 4 3 3 
Kuwait       
Oman       
Qatar    0 0 0 
Saudi Arabia  1 1 1 0 1 
Sudan  0 8  10 2 
UAE       
Yemen  10 25 11 34 0 
Arab Oil Exporters Average   3.3 7 6.8 11 1.3        
Other Oil Exporters       
Angola 5 4 26 28 26 25 
Azerbaijan 36 37 43 42 51 34 
Ecuador   31 31 50 49 
Eq. Guinea  0 0 0 4 0 
Indonesia 42 54 51 62 59 64 
Kazakhstan  35 38 48 51 53 
Mexico 50 55 52 61 66 79 
Nigeria 20 19 18 16 24 17 
Norway 72 80 83 83 84 85 
Peru  67 65 57 75 73 
Russia 47 58 60 74 74 72 
Trinidad and Tobago  33 33 38 34 33 
Venezuela  35 34 37 8 0 
Other Oil Exporters Average  35.1 39.8 41.1 44.4 46 44.9 
       
Source:  International Budget Partnership, Open Budget Survey    




























Algeria 2010 34.7 92 6.5 0 28.5a 
Bahrain 2010/1 1.2 4.3 0 0.6 89.2b 
Iran 2010 7.4 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Iraq 2016 2 7.5 2.1 3.7 84.1b 
Kuwait 2015 1.4 3.6 0 0 91.2 c 
Oman 2010/1 2.5 4.7 0 2.2 91.5c 
Qatar 2010/1 14.7 42.8 0 40.2 54.6c 
Saudi 
Arabia 2016 n.a. 15.7 0 2.9 79.0c 
UAEd 2016 0 1.2 0 0 0 
Norway 2015 22.4 55.9 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
             
Notes: a indicates taxes on goods and services, b indicates sales of goods and services, c 
indicates property income, d indicates that these shares are of the federal budget of the UAE 




Table 4: The Percentages of Non-Performing Loans in Total 
Outstanding Loans of Oil Exporting Countries and the World as 
a Whole Before and After Oil Price Declines 
 
Country 2008 2009 2014 2016 
Arab Countries     
Algeria 17.60 21.10 9.20 11.40 
Saudi Arabia 3.00 3.30 1.08 1.38 
U.A.E. 3.25 4.18 5.64 5.30 
     
Other Countries     
Angola   7.98 a 10.60 b 
Australia 1.40 2.00 4.00 7.00 
Brunei   3.85 4.62 
Canada 0.80 1.30 0.50 0.60 
Congo Republic   2.50 4.80 
Ecuador   3.58 3.96 
Equatorial Guinea   19.74 24.64 
Gabon   4.07 6.65 
Indonesia 3.20 3.30 2.07 2.90 
Kazakhstan 7.10 18.90 12.39 6.72 
Mexico 3.00 2.80 3.24 2.29 
Nigeria 7.19 37.25 2.96 12.82 
Norway 0.72 1.28 1.13 1.18 
Papua New Guinea.  1.78 2.02 1.80 3.08 
Peru   3.95 4.29 
Russian Republic 3.80 9.53 6.73 9.44 
Tajikhistan 5.40 9.60 13.20 a 19.10 b 
Trinidad and Tobago 2.44 4.88 4.06 3.12 
Venezuela   1.90 3.02      
World     4.07 3.92 
     
Notes: a represents 2013 and b represents 2015    
Source: World Bank Development Indicators and International 
Monetary Fund Global Financial Stability Reports. 
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Table 5: Fuel Subsidies in Arab Oil Exporting Countries, 1995-2014 
     
  









% of GDP 
(2011) Country 1995 1998 2000 2002 2010 2012 2014 
Algeria 0.4 0.31 0.27 0.22 0.32 0.28 0.27 10.4 6.7 
Bahrain  0.26 0.27 0.27 0.21 0.27 n.a 8.2 2.2 
Egypt 0.29 0.29 0.26 0.19 0.48 0.45 0.88 10.3 3.1 
Iran  0.08 0.05 0.07 0.1 0.33 0.374 12.3 4.6 
Iraq     0.78  0.43 11.5 2.8 
Kuwait  0.17 0.21 0.2 0.23 0.23 0.22 7.6 5.4 
Libya  - 0.25 0.1 0.17 0.12 n.a 9.1 4.5 
Oman  0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 6 4.6 
Qatar  0.16   0.19 0.27 0.23 4.2 1.6 
Saudi Arabia 0.16 0.16 0.24 0.24 0.16 0.16 0.16 10.1 8 
Sudan 0.5 0.33 0.28 0.3 0.62 0.75 0.82 1.7 3.2 
UAE  0.23 0.25 0.29 0.47 0.47 0.47 5.9 1.3 
Yemen  0.26 0.21 0.21 0.35 0.58 0.7 6.1 5 
          
Denmark 1.08 1.05 1.01 1.09 2 2.02 2.01   
Netherlands 1.21 1.14 1.03 1.12 2.13 2.33 2.15   
Norway 1.33 1.21 1.19 1.23 2.12 2.53 2.27     
          
Sources: Columns 2-7 from World Bank World Development Indicators; Column 8 from Clements, Benedict, David 
Coady, Stefanio Fabrizio, Sanjeev Gupta, Trevor Alleyne, and Carlo Sdralevich, eds. 2013. Energy Subsidy Reform: 
Lessons and Implications. Washington, D.C. International Monetary Fund.  
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Table 6: Measures of Military Expenditure and Arms Imports  
   
  
Military Expenditure (% of 
GDP)   Arms Imports (% of All Imports) 
Country 1990-99 2000-06 2007-15   1995-99 2000-05 2007-14 
Norway 2.47 1.77 1.48  6.6 1.67 1.14 
Algeria 2.78 3.27 4.29   2.15b 3.09 
Bahrain 5.38 3.95 3.71  2.48 4.2 2.84 
Iran 2.49 2.9 2.8  2.82 0.77 0.11 
Iraq   3.21   2.75b 6.43 
Kuwait 17.15a 6.06 3.67  10.72 4.47 3.67 
Libya 4.4 2.03 3.74  0.56 1.55 0.64 
Oman 14.23 11.8 11.8  5.4 1.78 2.42 
Qatar n/a 2.68 1.88   1.21b 1.89 
Saudi Arabia 11.54 9.17 9.13  27.5 14.61 2.74 
United Arab Emirates 7.7 5 5.13   5.0b 1.64 
        
Egypt 3.22 2.95 1.9  8.98 9.05 3.19 
Syria 7.13 5.2   2.28 1.48 3.54 
Sudan 3.34 3.31 4.12  2.68 3.68 1.5 
Tunisia 1.9 1.63 1.56  0.42 0.32 2.67 
Yemen 6.12 4.83 4.65   3.74 4.68 0.9 
        
Notes: Letter a indicates: 1991 omitted (117.3%), b: data available after 2004.  
Sources: Military expenditure data form Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) 
Military Expenditure Database. Imports data from World Military Expenditures and Arms 
Transfers (WMEAT) is prepared and published by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency, Department of State.  
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